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## ON THE MAIN LEVELS OF ACADEMIC CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

*In the article on the basis of the overview of historical sources were generalized the levels of competence, which correlate or influence national strategic cultures. The first level is awareness, as a result of self-education or extra education, which is described as non-critical. The highest level of competence is “mastering”, which allows to advantages and disadvantages of the extra-military scholarship, and to employ them in the most pragmatic way.*

**Key words:** national strategic culture; professional military education; competence; critical thinking.

**Defining the core issue.** Armed forces and professional military education were never separated from the civil science and education. The levels and ways of their interaction, causes of advantages and disadvantages of various ways of their interaction have to be investigated for better employment of the potential of academic civil-military relations in military education and science.

**Analysis of the latest publications.** The following scholars focused their attention on the civil-military relations: S. Huntington [7], M. Neiberg [14], M. Janowitz [8], academic component of the civil-military interaction: J. Luvaas [11], D.A. Downs, I. Murtazashvili [5], G.M. Lyons, J.W. Masland [12], G.C. Kennedy, K. Neilson [13], C.A. Watson [19], H. J. Wiarda [20], but detailed analytics on the concrete cases, levels and ways of academic interaction of armed forces and civil society, as well as generalizing researches are still absent.

**The aim of the article:** to investigate the main levels of the academic civil-military relations from the historical perspective.

**Exposition of the main material.** Lieutenant-general of the British army Sir William Francis Butler (1838 - 1910), whose statement is often erroneously ascribed to Thucydides, described the academic civil-military relations in the following way: “The nation that will insist upon drawing a broad line of demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to find its fighting done by fools and its thinking by cowards.” [2, p. 85]. This caveat will be always relevant, but only as a requirement for the future generations, because history tells

that warriors were never separated from the thinkers. Homer, “teacher of Greece”, taught Ancient world that powerful and brave heroes die, and wise and intelligent come back home alive with victory. This principle has been broadcasted through generations in Ancient Greece. Greek and Roman military leaders were educated by Ancient philosophers, which sometimes played crucial role in political and military affairs: for example, in the period of the end of I century CE – II century CE, when Roman stoicism culminated simultaneously with success of the Roman army. From the IV century BC the Ancient (and later – early Medieval) military science had been developing in the context of the Ancient and Byzantine intellectual/philosophic culture, as it can be seen in the texts of Xenophon (431 BC – 354 BC), Aeneas Tacticus (IV century BC), Marcus Porcius Cato the Elder (234 BC – 149 BC), Polybius (200 BC – c. 118 BC), Posidonius (c. 135 BC – c. 51 BC), Marcus Vitruvius Pollio (c. 80–70 BC – after c. 15 BC), Athenaeus Mechanicus (died 21 BC), Asclepiodotus Tacticus (1st century BC), Aulus Cornelius Celsus (c. 25 BC – c. 50 AD), Hero of Alexandria (c. 10 AD – c. 70 AD), Sextus Julius Frontinus (c. 40 – 103 AD), Onasander (1st century CE), Aelianus Tacticus (II century CE), Arrian of Nicomedia (c. 86/89 AD – c. after 146/160 AD), Apollodorus of Damascus (II century CE), Polyaeus (II century CE), Sextus Julius Africanus (c. 160 AD – c. 240 AD), Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus (IV century CE), Urbicius (V-VI century CE), Syrianus Magister (VI CE), Maurice (r. 582 AD – 602 AD), Leo VI the Wise (r. 886 AD – 912 AD),

Constantine VII Flavius Porphyrogenitus (17–18 May 905 AD – 9 November 959 AD), Nikephoros II Phokas (r. 963 AD – 969 AD), Hero of Byzantium (X century CE), Nikephoros Ouranos (c. 980 AD – c. 1010 AD), Kekaumenos (XI century CE), Michael Tarchaneiotes Glabas (c. 1235 AD – after 1304 AD), Theodore I Palaeologus (c. 1290 AD – 24 April 1338 AD).

Military theory of the Western Mediaeval age and Renaissance united Ancient inheritance and new literature canons (Raymond Lully (c. 1232 – c. 1315), Pierre Dubois (ca. 1255- post 1321), Geoffroi de Charny (1306-1356), Honoré Bonet (c. 1340 – c. 1410), Christine de Pizan (1363- ca. 1430), Conrad Kyeser (1366- post 1405), Mariano di Jacopo detto Il Taccola, (1382 - ca. 1453), Leonardo Bruni (1370 – 1444), Roberto Valturio (1405–1475), Jean de Bueil (1406- 1477), William Worcester (1415 – c. 1482), John Neele (XV century), Niccolo di Bernardo dei Machiavelli (1469 1527), Antonio Cornazzano (1483 - 1484), Tartaglia (Niccolo Fontana) (1500-1557), Blaise de Lasseran-Massencôme, seigneur de Montluc (c. 1502 – 1577), Raimond de Beccarie de Pavie, Seigneur de Fourquevaux (1509-1574), Ambroise Pare (1510 - 1590), Don Bernardino de Mendoza (1540 - 1604), Bertrand de Loque (b. between ca. 1540-1550, d. after 1600), Giorgio, Count of Huszt Basta (1544 - 1607), Justus Lipsius (October 18, 1547 - March 23, 1606), Matthew Sutcliffe (ca. 1550- 1629)). In the context of this tradition emerged the branch of applied philosophy “theory of just war”, which still essentially influences the political and legal aspects of war.

Military leaders of the Enlightenment established academic links with civil intellectuals, repeating the Ancient model, which included personal communication (like in the case of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Prince Eugene Francis of Savoy [16]), Immanuel Kant and Prussian officers [10, p. 113, 127], among them was Leopold Hermann Ludwig von Boyen (1771 - 1848), Prussian field-marshal, minister of war of Prussia; there are some mentions that field-marshal August Wilhelm Antonius Graf Neidhardt von Gneisenau (1760 – 1831) studied I.Kant’s works [10, p. 41].

European military academies maintained relations with the civil intellectuals. Up to 1870 military academies in Berlin and Munich had philosophy as a compulsory course; libraries of Germany, France, USA [6], Great Britain offered wide range of philosophic literature. In the recently published list of the books of Carl von Clausewitz’ library we can find, besides sources on strategy and tactics, writings of Wilhelm von Humboldt, Friedrich Schiller, Friedrich Schleiermacher. Thomas More, George Gordon Byron, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, William Shakespeare, Charles-Louis Montesquieu [3].

Military leaders of the Western world had never loose their relations with civil society, with its intellectual leaders and academic community. This level of communication can be named as basic, it reflects general awareness of the officers in realms other than professional interests – in philosophy, literature, history. This level can be described as leaking the critical assessment of ideas and methods, obtained from the extra-military academia.

Academic civil-military relations can be much complicated. For example, during the Second World War professor of history of the Yale University was involved into the work of the Office of Strategic Services, and during the Cold War, he became a founder of the analytic service of CIA [9]. Importance of proper employment of these relations is caused by the high level of responsibility of the military decision-maker, since they reflect a certain type of the national strategic culture, which is being influenced by non-military causes, mainly researched by the social sciences and humanities. Mere awareness cannot satisfy the requirements of the operational and strategic levels of command, thus new level of competence is needed: the level of mastering, which could help to avoid under- and overestimation the extra-military factors.

Critical treatment of authorities, sources of information, accustomed schemes of thinking are the basis of the pragmatism of military consciousness. However, the realization of the “mastering” during military service can be complicated by the various causes, specific to such conservative structures like armed forces. The complexities

with military intellectualism, both institutional and scholarly, are described in the classic book of M. Janovitz "The professional soldier": "In the military profession, as in any profession, self-criticism is an essential prerequisite in effecting change. But if it is to be more than self-castigation, self-criticism must have significant intellectual content. Intellectual ferment very often means stimulation from "the outside", even though the "outsider" may be found within the profession. The rise of the military manager has meant that greater effort has been exerted among officers to keep abreast of intellectual currents outside the profession. Ironically, the military profession seems to be vulnerable to new fashions in intellectual life, even before they have been submitted to adequate scrutiny.

Although military leaders do not think of themselves as intellectuals, their approach toward intellectual activity is a curious mixture. The military profession, because it emphasizes education and schooling, has a formal respect for intellectual achievement. The military manager must be prepared to make use of intellectual accomplishments, because he is so concerned with producing scientific solutions to complex administrative and organizational problems. Since the destructive capacities of weapons have virtually eliminated trial and error, military commanders are required to do their military planning more effectively. In such a setting, the products of intellectual efforts are deeply respected, to the measure of their practical worth.

Moreover, the educated man is seen as having an intrinsic merit as well. The military leader believes that the research scientist and university professor is a dedicated public servant like himself, and, as such, is immune to the excesses of sheer commercial pursuits. The military stand in respect for those men in civilian society who devote their life to intellectual pursuits, although there are important service differences. Of the services, the Navy displays the least respect for intellectual – civilian and military.

Negativism toward intellectual pursuits is rooted partially in the fear that unguided intellectualism produces irresponsibility. Clearly, action, and responsibility for one's action, are more valued than reflection in any

organization where combat is the basic goal. Thus, despite its propensity to introduce technological change, the military establishment remains resistant to sudden innovations or brilliant insights which might cause doubt and temporary paralysis. Among professional soldiers, anti-intellectualism can also express itself in an uncritical veneration of the military treatises of the past which, with almost metaphysical reverence, are taken as permanent contributions to military doctrine. Another manifestation of anti-intellectualism is the reduction of complex problems to technical formulations. Ideas are judged as practical or impractical after there has been a staff study by men who can exaggerate the power of their "generalist" thinking... The ability of the military intellectual to use social science hinges upon organizational arrangements, because intellectual activity has become a complicated group activity. On the one hand, the military intellectual requires detachment from immediate policy questions in order to produce new ideas and new solutions. On the other hand, he requires access to the military elite in a staff capacity if his endeavors are to be realistic and if they are to be brought to bear on the professional life of the military establishment. Attempts to utilize the social sciences for strategic issues in the military establishment have not been conspicuously successful, in part because of an inability to achieve a proper balance between detachment and involvement. Some of the most conspicuous efforts have been tied too closely to immediate operational problems. At the war colleges, including the National War College, advanced research groups have been established to draw upon developments in the social sciences. These enterprises have not been considered highly successful, partly because expectations were too great and partly because the armed forces have been reluctant to underwrite sufficient long-term support. Nor have efforts to utilize social science by means of semi-independent research groups, under military sponsorship, been profoundly successful, except in the field of economics, where these enterprises have been effectively linked with both the military establishment and the most competent university-based social scientists. The efforts of the military intellectual will

remain hampered until the university community develops a more organized and more sustained concern with the social science study of military and national security affairs” [8, p. 430-435]. The ideas expressed in 1960 are still relevant, though scholars, both civil and military, brought more complexity into their interaction often refusing to admit the failures of the methods which showed their non-applicability.

Sometimes professional conservatism can essentially interfere making the right decisions, which can have fatal consequences. Strategic blunders of the initial stage of the First World War plausibly correlate the character of the strategic cultures of France and Germany. At the beginning of the XXth century, the most fashionable thinker in France was Henry Bergson, whose personal and scholarly influence was so powerful, that this obtained a name “Bergsonian plot in the French staff”, had not met its critics. Ideas of intuition as the main method of cognition and “*élan vital*” [17, 18], which were embraced by the intellectual community of France (which included French higher generals as well) showed their irrelevance in the first months of the First World War. Intuition could not replace strategic planning, and “total offensive” as the analogue of “*élan vital*” without properly defined aim and not corresponding the real situation on the battlefield, could make positive results only occasionally (which did not happen in 1914).

However, if the proposal to follow the ideas the founder of the French rationalism Rene Descartes was accepted [15], than deductive foundations of the strategic decisions could have absolutely the same effect as Bergson’s ideas. Even before the First World War, in 1912, Bergson received fundamental criticism from Bertrand Russell, which remained mostly unheard by the French civil and military intellectuals. In the interwar period even the public defeat that Bergson suffered from Albert Einstein did not decrease the Bergson’s authority, at least in the military community. Maurice Gamelin, “general-professor”, one of the authors of defeat of France in 1940, was Bergson’s sympathetic as well. In spite of profound critique of the interwar “leader of thoughts”

in France, military intellectuals were not able to express any doubt about effectiveness of the strategic decisions, which correlated with popular, but erroneous cognitive schemes, and France and her allies paid high price for this. Awareness and education do not necessary lead to the level of “mastering”, but they can be a source of illusions and fatal myths.

Nevertheless, history describes cases when military leaders showed sufficient level of competence that helped to avoid becoming victims of the wrong ideas. In the interwar period, German generals Friedrich von Rabenau and Hans von Seeckt were forced to defend their plans of reforms of the German army against attacks of the veterans of the First World War, psychologists Ernst Junger and Kurt Hess [4, p. 57-62]. Balanced and well-reasoned criticism of new approaches to war allowed to complete successfully reform of Reichswehr. But, if to apply counterfactual model and to assume that Hess and Junger had been higher officers, than in this case only competence of Rabenau and Seeckt would not be enough to defend the plan of the reforms.

**Conclusions.** Any war is a realization of an epistemological scheme. Success in war depends on the understanding of advantages and disadvantages of these schemes by the military leaders. The tasks of a military leader are not limited by searching of advantages and disadvantages of metastrategic factors, which influence strategic culture. The obtained solution has to be implemented into the process of making strategic decisions, which can be severely interfered by a “strategic mainstream”.

Academic civil-military relations can be a factor which would be able to ease the tasks of a military intellectual, offering a complete critique, refutation or proof of these cognitive schemes and methods, which can play central role in the process of strategic decision-making. The better an officer could understand the complexity of factors, which influence strategic culture, the bigger chances he has to use that advantage, which is offered by the highest level of the competence, which is called “mastering”.

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Резюме

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**АКАДЕМІЧНІ ЦИВІЛЬНО-ВІЙСЬКОВІ ЗВ'ЯЗКИ: ОСНОВНІ РІВНІ**

*В статті на основі огляду джерел з історії воєнної теорії та сучасних праць з проблем академічної цивільно-військової взаємодії були узагальнені рівні компетенції, які корелюють або мають вплив на утворення національних стратегічних культур. Перший рівень – це обізнаність, інформованість про метастратегічні фактори, який досягається через самоосвіту чи здобуття додаткової освіти; він характеризується відсутністю критичного осмислення отриманої інформації. Найвищий рівень компетентності – це опанування («mastering») ідеями та методами, які пропонують цивільні науки та освіта. На цьому рівні офіцер розуміє переваги та недоліки напрацювань позаплітарних наук, здатен використовувати це розуміння на свою користь.*

*Ключові слова:* національна стратегічна культура, професійна військова освіта, компетенція, критичне мислення.